The Trump administration cannot legally abolish the International Criminal Court, but it may not need to. Its new campaign is structured around a more achievable objective: making participation in the court increasingly expensive for governments, officials, companies, and service providers that also depend on the US.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio on July 13 announced a “whole-of-government” effort to disable the ICC’s ability to investigate or prosecute American military personnel and officials. Proposed measures include additional sanctions, visa restrictions, pressure on US allies, and heightened scrutiny of countries that support the court while receiving American military, law-enforcement, or security assistance.
Can it?
The ICC was established under the Rome Statute, an international treaty that entered into force in 2002. The US is not a party to that treaty and has no vote in the Assembly of States Parties, the body responsible for the court’s budget, governance, and institutional rules.
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The ICC currently has 125 member countries. Each holds representation in the Assembly, which approves the court’s finances and elects its judges and prosecutor.
No provision gives a non-member country authority to terminate the institution.
Even member states cannot simply demand its abolition. Major amendments to the Rome Statute generally require approval by a two-thirds majority and, depending on the provision, ratification or acceptance by as many as seven-eighths of the states parties before taking effect.
Individual governments can withdraw, but departure does not automatically end existing investigations involving conduct that occurred while the country was covered by the treaty.
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The Philippines illustrates that limit. Its withdrawal became effective in March 2019, but the ICC retained jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed during the period when the country was a member. Former president Rodrigo Duterte was surrendered to the court in March 2025 under a warrant covering alleged crimes committed before withdrawal.
The US campaign would therefore need to persuade enough governments to withdraw, stop financing the institution, or refuse cooperation until the court becomes practically ineffective. Washington cannot produce that result by executive order alone.
But what can it do?
The court operates on a relatively modest budget for a global judicial institution. Its 2026 programme budget totals €196.85 million, funded primarily through assessed contributions from member governments. The Rome Statute also permits voluntary funding and certain UN contributions, particularly for cases referred by the Security Council.
The US does not need to be a direct contributor to influence those resources. American sanctions can prohibit US citizens and companies from providing funds, goods, or services to designated individuals. They can also discourage banks, insurers, technology vendors, consultants, and international organizations from interacting with the court because many rely on US payment systems, software, cloud infrastructure, or access to American markets.
Trump used that mechanism in February 2025 when he issued an executive order authorizing sanctions against ICC personnel involved in investigations of US citizens or allies from countries that had not accepted the court’s jurisdiction.
The sanctions were subsequently applied to prosecutors, judges, and other figures connected to ICC activity. Court documents later acknowledged that financial restrictions had directly affected operations and infrastructure and created new risks for personnel.
That record suggests the administration’s strongest tool is not treaty law. It is the reach of the US financial system.
A loyalty test?
Rubio’s campaign also introduces a wider political calculation for American allies. The State Department said countries that benefit from US military cooperation, law-enforcement partnerships, or the American security umbrella should reject the ICC’s authority over US personnel. Governments that refuse may face greater scrutiny while seeking American assistance.
The statement does not specify whether that scrutiny could affect arms sales, intelligence sharing, training programmes, aid, or diplomatic support. Still, the framing effectively places ICC membership alongside bilateral security relations. Governments may be pressed to demonstrate which institution takes priority when treaty obligations conflict with Washington’s demands.
That pressure will be most consequential in countries that are both ICC members and heavily dependent on the US for defence, intelligence, or financing.
The administration is also urging countries outside the Rome Statute system to lobby against the court through their own diplomatic networks. The objective appears to be broader than protecting Americans from prosecution. It is to organize a rival coalition of governments that reject the ICC’s jurisdictional model.
The jurisdiction dispute
The administration argues that Americans never consented to ICC jurisdiction because the US did not ratify the Rome Statute.
By nature, the court’s position is that nationality is not the only basis for jurisdiction. Under the statute, the ICC may investigate alleged crimes committed on the territory of a member state even when the accused is a citizen of a non-member country. Afghanistan became a party to the Rome Statute in 2003, giving the court a territorial basis to examine alleged crimes committed there by Afghan, Taliban, and foreign personnel. ICC judges authorized the Afghanistan investigation to resume in October 2022.
The State Department says the investigation previously encompassed alleged conduct by US military and intelligence personnel and that those matters have not been formally closed. The current extent of active investigative work concerning Americans remains unclear from public ICC material.
The dispute is whether a country can shield its nationals from a territorial jurisdiction accepted by the country where the alleged conduct occurred.
